We analyze a unique dataset to test an empirical model of retail bank fee determinants in five Central European countries. Due to the data structure we can cope with heterogeneity and cross-subsidization by employing a representative fee index instead of using variables associated with individual fees. We find support for the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis about the effect of industry concentration, the importance of differences in reliance on cashless payments, and differences in the labor intensity and technology level of bank operations. We also show that cross-country differences in retail bank fees can be explained by fundamental economic factors.
Introduction
Compared to the extensive body of empirical papers on the determinants of bank interest rates, very few empirical studies have dealt with retail bank fees. The main reason appears to be the impossibility-or, even in the case of the U.S.A., the extreme difficulty-of obtaining quality data on retail bank fees of the size and level of detail necessary for rigorous empirical analysis (Hannan, 2006) .
Because of the high degree of heterogeneity in bank fees and different crosssubsidizations it has been difficult to implement an appropriate approach in any cross-country comparison due to data restrictions.
Let us note, however, that a number of papers imply that banks' decisions about interest rates and fees are interconnected. Specifically, Lepetit et al. (2008) and Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) find an inverse relationship between measures of fee income and interest margins.
1 Thus, their results support the hypothesis of cross-subsidization between interest-and non-interest-bearing activities and also suggest that the link between the fee levels and the margins should be controlled for in any empirical analysis.
As reviewed by Brewer and Jackson (2006) or Shaffer (2004) , the two main competing theories on the relationship between industry concentration and pricing are the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis (Mason (1939) and Bain (1951 Bain ( , 1956 ) and the Efficient Structure hypothesis (ES) (Demsetz (1973) and Peltzman (1977) ). 2 Within the context of the banking industry, a number of studies have found a negative relationship between deposit interest rates and concentration, thus supporting the SCP hypothesis (Berger and Hannan (1989) , Calem and Carlino (1991) , Hannan and Berger (1991) , Jackson (1992) , and Brewer and Jackson (2006) ). 3 The existing literature implies that among the most likely supply-side factors affecting the vast differences in bank fees from country to country are bank costs, market competitiveness, and the extent and form of banking industry regulation. Among demand-side factors, cross-subsidization between different bank products is a possibility as banks try to maximize the benefits from a pool of clients with given demand characteristics.
Our empirical analysis of the cross-country determinants of bank fees is made possible by the availability of a unique dataset on bank fee levels in five Central
European countries: Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
The structure of our dataset enables us to cope with heterogeneity and crosssubsidization by employing a representative fee index instead of using variables associated with individual fees.
The socio-geographic region formed by these countries has several important advantages for our purposes. First, these countries are characterized by significant differences in the maturity of their banking sectors. 4 When compared with Austria, a traditionally strong banking country, the other four countries are still in with only one firm but with low enough barriers to mobility can be characterized by prices close to the perfectly competitive level. 3 The typical specification in this research includes the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of industry concentration or the top-three-firm concentration ratio as a measure of concentration, plus a vector of control variables. Brewer and Jackson (2006) show that it is important to control for bankspecific riskiness, since otherwise there might be spurious regression as banks in more concentrated markets might be less risky and thus charge lower rates. The existence of the positive link between individual bank riskiness and deposit rates is shown by Brewer and Mondschean (1994) and the negative link between concentration and riskiness by Rhoades and Rutz (1982) . Brewer and Jackson (2006) thus include measures of capital adequacy and asset quality. 4 See Hanousek, Kocenda and Ondko (2007) , which documents the differences in the privatization of the banking sectors in Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the ensuing significant changes in financial flows between the banking sector and other sectors of the economy.
the process of gradually developing their banking sectors. Second, since much of the geographic region in our dataset shares a common history as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, these Central European countries form a compact group with strong cultural and historical links, except for the fact that Austria does not share a communist history as a Soviet satellite like the other four do. As a result, there are important similarities in consumption habits and needs, 5 in views about the role of money, and in the ultimate behavior of bank clients in relation to banks. To summarize, the time span along with the differences in development help identify the effects of the variables in our model, and the similarities make it easier to compare fee levels across these countries.
Overall, our analysis can be understood as one of the first cross-country empirical studies on the determinants of bank fees and as a contribution to the literature testing the contradictory empirical predictions of the SCP and ES hypotheses regarding the influence of concentration on prices in the banking industry. From the policymaking point of view our contribution sheds light on the issue of whether there are fundamental economic reasons for cross-country differences in bank fees; namely, we show that fees scaled by proxies for purchasing power parity tend to be higher in less developed countries. Last but not least, our results support recent international comparisons (Capgemini, ING and EFMA 2005, 2006 ) that report a negative relationship between the economic level of a country and fee levels scaled by GDP per capita.
Model
Conceptually, we base our model mainly on the setups of Hannan (2006) and Brewer and Jackson (2006) . In contrast to Hannan (2006) , we use an index of fees instead of individual fees as the dependent variable and we modify the setup to control for greater heterogeneity in the data. Unlike Brewer and Jackson (2006), 6 the index composition is based on the actual distribution of services purchased by a representative bank client instead of imposing equal weights. 7 We scale the fee index by total deposits per capita in a given country to capture both the effect of a purchasing power parity adjustment as well as an indication of the general development of the country's banking sector.
The use of a fee index has several important advantages compared to the use of individual fees. Most critically, this approach is robust to differences in banks' strategies for pricing their portfolios of services. Within the category of core dayto-day services there exists at least four broad pricing approaches (account-based, packaged-based, transaction-based and indirect revenue-based 8 ), which differ in how banks generate revenues from comparable portfolios of services. Two banks may charge a completely different price for a given service while the total price of a specified set of services may be exactly equal due to cross-subsidization within the banks' portfolios. Thus, a well-specified index of the total price of a typicallyconsumed bundle of services can clearly convey better information about the international differences in the costs of basic retail bank services than any of the individual fees.
The general framework used to build our empirical model consists of four main factors: (1) the cost of providing fee-related services, (2) competition, (3) regulation, and (4) demand-side (client-related) factors. The cost of providing feerelated services influences the fee level even under marginal cost pricing, i.e.
under perfect competition. Competition and regulation determine the deviation of fees from marginal costs even in a single product environment. Finally, clientrelated factors account for the deviation from marginal cost pricing due to banks offering multiple products (the basic services represent only a subset of these products).
We follow Hannan (2006) and include bank size measured by total bank assets.
The bank size can be expected to be a good proxy for many cost factors but only within a given country and during a certain period of time. As our dataset includes a heterogeneous mix of countries, we must control for labor costs and technology level, which can vary significantly among countries and over time. We do this by including the individual effect and a proxy for the level of the labor intensity of the banks' operations measured by personnel expenses normalized by the bank's assets. Furthermore, we control for the bank's riskiness by including the share of common equity in total bank assets, as recommended by Brewer and Jackson (2006) .
To control for potentially huge differences in the cost of providing payment services implied by the degree to which each country's banks rely on cashless payments, we include a proxy for cashless payments measured by the number of payment cards issued in a country per million inhabitants.
To measure the effect of competition on the level of fees we use the market share of the top five banks as an indicator of industry concentration in the banking industry. As part of the sensitivity analysis, we also control for non-banking competition by using the measure of total assets managed by insurance companies, investment funds and pension funds.
9
Different countries have different regulatory measures, some of which have a direct impact on basic bank services. Although hypothesizing the effects of these differing regulations is difficult, controlling for this significant source of external influence is clearly important. It is natural to expect that tighter regulation could mean a less competitive banking sector and, thus, greater pricing power for banks.
Regulation can also target fees directly, however, in which case tighter regulation could lead to lower fee levels. To control for the effect of regulation we include the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index of regulation for the given country.
On the demand side (client-related factors), as a result of a multi-product nature of the pricing process, a typical bank offers at least two types of products: basic (account management, payments, cash utilization, etc.) and intermediation services (deposit and credit services reflected for example by the spread between the interest rates on deposits and loans). These products are clearly connected.
When a client wants to get credit from a bank she must first have an account there-i.e. she needs to buy a basic service, too. In such a context, basic services 9 As an alternative we could use a more direct measure of competition, the Panzar-Rosse Hstatistics (based on Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Rosse (1982, 1987) ) defined as the sum of the elasticities of the bank's revenues with respect to input prices (H<=0 implies monopoly/cartel, 0<H<1 implies oligopoly/monopolistic competition, H=1 implies perfect competition). Unfortunately, the data on the H-statistics are not easily available for the countries and the time period in our sample (furthermore, the methodology of H-statistics estimation differs among authors); a rigorous analysis with the H-statistics is thus left for further research. As a preliminary step, we estimated the model with the historical values of H-statistics from Bikker, Spierdijk and Finnie (2007) and received a positive effect of H-statistics on the normalized fees. For a discussion of the recent use of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics see for example Bikker, Spierdijk and Finnie (2007) .
may be used as a loss-leader and, thus, cross-subsidization effects may influence the level of fees for these services.
Since potential cross-subsidization among the main types of bank services may significantly affect the level of fees (which can be understood as the price of the basic services), we follow the existing literature in suggesting the existence of the link between net interest margins and fee income (e.g. Lepetit, et al. (2008) or Demirguç-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004)), and include the net interest margin as a control for the connection to the intermediation services.
Based on the rationale above, the estimated equation can be expressed as (for bank i, country j and time t): .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 The exact definitions and sources of the individual variables used in the analysis are given in Table   A .1 in the Appendix.
Results
Estimation results are reported in Table 3 The insignificance of ASSETS should not be surprising since much of ASSETS' role as a proxy for cost factors is captured by the fixed effects. ASSETS would arguably become significant under a more dynamic specification capturing the growth of bank assets. Although our dataset includes countries with maturing banking sectors, we did not observe this dynamic growth due to the limited time dimension of the dataset.
12 Our positive sign is in line with the negative one received by Brewer and Jackson (2006) as they are studying the impact on deposit interest rates instead of fees. Note: t-statistics are presented in brackets. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Sensitivity analysis
In order to check the robustness of our results, we estimate variants of the model with alternative measures of the main explained or explanatory variables and also with alternative exclusions of potential outliers. The estimation procedure remains the fixed effects specification as the Hausman test rejects a random effect specification at the 1 percent significance level in all cases.
We first run the same regression as above, but with an alternative dependent variable in the form of the fee index scaled by GDP per capita. The results of the regression are reported in Column 2 in Table 4 (Column 1 reports the original results for comparison). CASHLESS ceases to be significant, but this can arguably be caused by a relatively strong relationship between the CASHLESS and PERSON variables, which are both related to the development of the banking sector in a given country. The fit of the regression measured by the within R squared also decreases. The coefficients of the significant variables remain very similar. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Next, we exclude ASSETS from the regression because it is not significant and much of its role in a fixed effect model is arguably captured by the fixed effects.
The results, reported in Column 2 in Table 5 , show that the exclusion of ASSETS does not have an important effect on the value of the remaining coefficients, the significance of the variables or the regression fit (Column 1 reports the regression with ASSETS for comparison). Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
We further report the results of the same regression as in the previous case 13 (without ASSETS) but after the exclusion of e-Banka, which in this time used a specific distribution channel that relied almost exclusively on internet banking.
The results, reported in Column 2 in Table 6 , show that the exclusion of e-Banka has only a marginal effect on the regression results (Column 1 shows the regression with e-Banka for comparison). Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Since Austria is arguably the source of a great portion of the variation in our data, it is interesting to assess how much the results change if we exclude Austrian banks. The results, reported in Column 2 in Table In the next step, we include loan loss provisions scaled by net profit as an additional variable in the model. This variable could be understood as a proxy measure of the quality of the bank portfolio and/or as an imperfect proxy for the degree of asymmetric information or quality of loans the given bank is facing.
Internationally harmonized regulatory systems require banks to create loan loss provisions in a volume reflecting the expected repayment of loans. Results of the modified regressions are presented in Table 8 . The significant and positive effect of the new variable supports the hypothesis that a lower quality of loans (or a higher degree of asymmetric information) is associated with higher fees. In Table 8 and in all earlier specifications we always use MSHARE as a measure of the degree of competition in the given banking market. In Table 9 we present the sensitivity of the chosen measure for banking competition, especially market share versus the Herfindahl-type index. Column 2 of Table 9 shows the results after exchanging MSHARE for HHI (i.e. the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as in
Hannan (2006)) and Column 3 shows the results with MSHARE and after including also total assets managed by insurance companies, investment funds and pension funds scaled by total bank assets in the country (OTHCOMP) as a proxy for non-banking competition. Although the inclusion of OTHCOMP makes both OTHCOMP and MSHARE insignificant, the two variables are jointly significant. Note: t-statistics are presented in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Based on the results of our analysis, it can be expected that in the future fee levels will converge in line with the convergence of economic fundamentals.
Conclusions
Specifically, we can expect this to happen due to the convergence in the degree of competition through the continuing elimination of barriers to international competition between banks (for example, some of the countries in our dataset are expected to enter the Euro-zone soon), in the degree of reliance on cashless payments (with the increasing buying power of consumers) and the labor intensity and technological level of the banks' operations (with the continuing proliferation of more advanced technologies and the converging cost of labor).
The crucial message of our results is that the international differences in the levels of fees can be explained by fundamental economic factors. Our results oppose simplified explanations of the fee differences based on the banking market behaving as a pure cartel. Thus, the analysis in this paper also contributes to the continuing public debate about the implications of the prevailing fee levels for competition policy and the approach of regulatory institutions to banks.
